Λοιπόν gaius, μιας και δεν καταλαβαίνεις τι είναι ή ίσως πως φτιάχνονται τα στατιστικά στοιχεία, ας σε βοηθήσω.<br>Από ΟΛΑ τα ατυχήματα, βγάζεις πόσοι νεκροί, τραυματίες κ.λπ. έγιναν.<br>Μετά λες σε ΑΥΤΑ τα ατυχήματα (για 2 διαφορετικές χρονικές περιόδους) : <br>Α) Ποια έγιναν από ανθρώπινο λάθος;<br>Β) Ποια από λάθος της εταιρείας; <br>κ.λ.π.<br><br>Και μετά βγάζεις ΑΡΙΘΜΟΥΣ. Ποιο απλό δεν μπορώ να στο κάνω.<br>Αυτά που έδωσες εσύ ΔΕΝ είναι στατιστικά στοιχεία, αλλά 4 περιπτώσεις από τις 38 που έγιναν 1995-2016.<br>Άμα σου δώσω στο διάστημα 1974-1994, 5 περιπτώσεις παρόμοιες με αυτές που έγραψες δεν σημαίνει ότι την τότε εικοσαετία ήταν χειρότερα γιατί πρέπει να βγάλεις ποσοστά.<br>Εγώ λοιπόν σου δίνω 8 περιπτώσεις. Οπότε περίοδος 1974-1994 Ποσοστό ατυχημάτων (8/53) λόγω της διοίκησης = 15%<br>Για την περίοδο 1994-2016 Ποσοστό ατυχημάτων (4/38) λόγω της διοίκησης : 10%.<br><br>Μικρότερο ποσοστό, άρα πιο ασφαλής ο σιδηρόδρομος με την ιδιωτικοποίηση.<br><br>Ας δώσω όμως και μερικά παραπάνω στοιχεία. Δεν είναι όλα τα ατυχήματα καθώς ΠΑΡΑ ΠΟΛΛΑ ατυχήματα από το 74-94 δεν είχαν ειδικές έρευνες στους συνδέσμους τους.<br><span class="bbcode_spoiler"><ul><br><li>1975 - The inquiry, conducted by Major C.F.Rose, found the accident to be due to the following causes;<br><br>It was found that the gas equipment which powered the warning lights on the advance warning board was not being used properly, and had thus gone out;<br>A number of drivers on preceding trains noticed that the lights had gone out, yet did not stop at Nuneaton to report the fact;<br></li><br><br><li>22/10/1979 - Various operating staff who saw the signal before and after the accident also gave evidence that the arm was not properly horizontal, including some who said that the degree of elevation appeared to increase as they got closer to it. It was later found that the signal post bracket was badly bent. The bracket may have been struck by a chain hanging from a wagon, or perhaps by engineers' machinery working on the lineside.[2]<br><br><b>In addition, the signalling at Longforgan was basic and lacking in many safety features. The Starting signal had no AWS that would have warned the driver of the Aberdeen train, nor was there an adjuster for the pull wire. There was also no repeater in the signal box, nor was a detonator placer provided.[1]</b></li><br><br><br><li>05/09/1977 - Farnley Junction, Leeds: Signalling problems resulting from technical work by engineering staff lead to head-on collision between passenger service and mail train.</li><br><br><li>4/12/1984 - There had been problems with the signalling in the area, and track circuits had been affected by a maintenance gang working on the track nearby, but the inspector was satisfied that the signals which had been passed at danger were working properly and showing the correct aspects. They were, however, not fitted with the AWS warning system to alert the driver to his error. In the absence of any conflicting medical evidence, the inquiry was forced to conclude that the driver had simply allowed his attention to wander and had missed the Eccles signals – it was testified by staff that it was rare for these signals to be set at danger.</li><br><br><li>At 05:50 on 20 December 1984, the train, carrying more than 1,000,000 litres (220,000 imp gal; 260,000 US gal) (835 tonnes or 822 long tons or 920 short tons) of four-star petrol in thirteen tankers entered the tunnel on the Yorkshire (north) side travelling at 40 miles per hour (64 km/h). <b>One-third of the way through the tunnel, a defective-axle bearing (journal bearing) derailed the fourth tanker, which caused the derailment of those behind. </b>Only the locomotive and the first three tankers remained on the rails. One of the derailed tankers fell on its side and began to leak petrol into the tunnel. Vapour from the leaking petrol was probably ignited by the damaged axle box.[1]</li><br><br><li>15-06-1986 - Motherwell: Defective and poorly maintained track coupled with hot weather. At approximately 16.31 the 16.10 Glasgow Central to London Euston passenger train became derailed on the approach to Motherwell Station.</li><br><br><li>21/07/1991 - The accident was attributed to the Cathcart Circle train passing a signal at danger and causing a collision at the single-lead junction, as at Bellgrove in Glasgow just over a year earlier. The junction's configuration was newly installed at a cost of £5 million and designed to be simpler than the double-lead junction that it replaced.[6] This allowed faster running on the WCML following the East Coast electrification (through Carstairs) but was inherently less safe. The configuration was unnecessarily constrained and was strongly criticised in the accident report[7] and by contemporary commentators (Hall 1999).</li><br><br><li>6 March 1989 - ίδια φάση με το ατύχημα στις 21/07/1991</li><br><br><li>There were several other contributory factors; it was conjectured that the AWS may have been inoperative (though the official report considers this unlikely), the signal was dirty and the light intensity was low, and there were no trap points to prevent a train wrongly entering a section against the signal. However the official report placed the blame on the driver of the northbound train, Brian Barton.<br><br>It was noted that the Oxted signalman, who was aware of the situation, had no direct means of alerting either driver to the danger. He apparently attempted to contact the down driver on the signal telephone (the up driver having passed the protecting signal - as noted at danger), but to no avail (presumably the driver never heard it above the noise of the engine immediately behind him). The signalman did alert the emergency services to the collision - while the trains were still one mile apart. The reason for cancelling the contract to fit Cab Secure Radio to this line prior to the incident and in the wake of the previous Clapham disaster and Hidden report recommendations, remains unclear, however it seems likely that the changes occurring at the time (Channel Tunnel and privatisation of the Network) took priority over funding. Cab Secure Radio was installed immediately following the incident and an inquiry was started.<br><br><b>The accident was exacerbated by the age and design of the multiple units involved. </b>The separate-chassis construction of the elderly British Rail Class 205 stock, based on the BR Mk 1 design, led to overriding of one carriage by the next. The weight of the diesel engines above the frames of the coach probably did not help. These trains, unpopular with users of the line because of their antiquated nature, were replaced in 2004 by Turbostars./li]<br><br><br>Περίεργες περιπτώσεις<br><br>11/10/1984<br>Medical board<br>The investigation turned its attention to the medical board when it was discovered that the driver Ronald Armstrong (born 25 July 1921) was found to have an unusual medical history. Armstrong regularly informed the board about suffering episodes of irregular disturbed vision that occurred three to four times a year without warning. Armstrong said he did not have such an episode when driving a train although he did suffer disturbed vision whilst driving his car.[3]<br><br>Armstrong had also suffered from morning headaches which dated back many years which often occurred when getting up. Although the symptoms were dull, never severe and frontal in situation, he slept well but tended to wake in the early hours. He also suffered from bouts of indigestion, which was treated with bicarbonate of soda. Armstrong also suffered from panic attacks with an episode occurring before the accident. One medical condition he no longer suffered from was breathlessness and he also lost his sense of smell 18 months before the accident occurred.[3]<br><br>HATFIELD 2000<br><br>A preliminary investigation found a rail had fragmented as trains passed and that the likely cause was "rolling contact fatigue" (defined as multiple surface-breaking cracks). Such cracks are caused by high loads where the wheels contact the rail.[12][13] Repeated loading causes fatigue cracks to grow. When they reach a critical size, the rail fails. Portions of the failed track at Hatfield were reassembled and numerous fatigue cracks were identified; these contributed to spalling of the running surface to around five millimetres (0.20 in) deep and 100 millimetres (3.9 in) long.[14]<br><br>The problem was known about before the accident; a letter from the infrastructure company Railtrack in December 1999 warned that the existing Railtrack Line Specification was insufficient to guard against this type of fatigue.[15] Replacement rails were made available but never delivered to the correct location for installation.[16]<br><br>Since privatisation, Railtrack had divested the engineering knowledge of British Rail into contractors. While it had comprehensive maintenance procedures that might have prevented the accident if followed appropriately, later investigation showed there was a serious problem with the experience and working knowledge of staff.[17] In a subsequent interview, the Zone Quality Standards Manager said, "I do not have knowledge of railway engineering nor railway safety," which was completely contrary to the written requirements for the role.[18] In May 1999, the Head of Track had said that insufficiently skilled work was causing more rails to break.[19] Railtrack did not know how many other cases of rail fatigue around the network could lead to a Hatfield-like accident[20] and consequently imposed over 1,800 emergency speed restrictions and instigated a nationwide (and costly) track replacement programme.[21] The company was subject to "enforcement" by the Rail Regulator, Tom Winsor.[22]<br><br><br>9/03/1986<br>Chinley, Derbyshire: Multiple errors by inexperienced signalman led to passenger train being sent onto line where two coupled locomotives were waiting. Collision despite driver of lead waiting locomotives starting to reverse when he saw other train approaching.<br><br>παρεμφερή ατυχήματα<br><br>The impact of the collision destroyed the animal, but a significant part of the carcass, later thought to be a leg bone, became trapped under the leading bogie of the DBSO, lifting it off the track and derailing it. The DBSO ran derailed for approximately 100 yards and then veered to the left, and ran up the edge of the cutting into trees at the top. It then turned on its side as it was pushed round by the force of the train behind. The second vehicle, after climbing over the rear end of the DBSO, somersaulted end over end, eventually hitting the fifth vehicle as it ran past it, and the third vehicle was hit by the DBSO as it fell back down the wall of the cutting after rebounding from the trees. The DBSO and third vehicle were so badly damaged they had to be cut up on site.<br><br>Casualties were mainly in the two leading vehicles, and most fatalities were due to passengers being ejected through windows or hit by other passengers or objects as the vehicles were thrown about. The possibility of trains being fitted with seatbelts was raised and rejected, as it was again 20 years later after the derailment at Ufton Nervet in 2004.<br><br>The main focus was that the light axle-loading of the DBSO had led to its being more easily derailed than a heavier vehicle would have been, and modifications were put in place to lessen the chances of a recurrence of the derailment. This problem was to be revisited in the Selby accident in 2001, where a leading coach of a train being powered from the rear was again derailed by an object (this time a motor vehicle) on the line.<br>[/list]</span><br><br>Potters Bar 2002 - Poor Maintenance.<br>Ladbroke 1999 - ATP - Κατάργηση Πρόσθετης Ασφάλειας λόγω κόστους<br>Hatfield 2000 - "Rolling Contact Fatigue" - Poor Maintenance<br>Southrail 1997 - ATP - Κατάργηση Πρόσθετης Ασφάλειας λόγω κόστους<br><br>05/09/1977 - Ελλιπής συντήρηση.<br>22/10/1979 - Ελλιπής συντήρηση + Έλλειψη Πρόσθετων Μέτρων Ασφαλείας στο σταθμό. Άμα είχανε λάβει μέτρα για το σταθμό θα μπορούσε να αποφευχθεί.<br>4/12/1984 - Η ομάδα συντήρησης έλεγξε πως όλα δούλευαν ,αλλά η διοίκηση δεν είχε μεριμνήσει τα σήματα να έχουν συνέπεια με το υπόλοιπο σύστημα. Αν είχε μεριμνήσει το κράτος θα χε αποφευχθεί.<br>20/12/1984 - Ελλιπής συντήρηση. <br>15/06/1986 - Eλλιπής συντήρηση ραγών. Μπορεί να συσχετιστεί με το ατύχημα του Hatfield το 2.000.<br>06/03/1989 - Ατύχημα από εγκατάσταση λιγότερο ασφαλών ρυθμίσεων.<br>21/07/1991 - Ατύχημα από εγκατάσταση λιγότερο ασφαλών ρυθμίσεων.<br>1994 - Ελλιπής συντήρηση, ηλικία αμαξοστοιχίας και λοιπών μονάδων.<br><br>Αυτά προφανώς δεν είναι όλα. Γιατί δεν έψαξα ενδελεχώς. Και ούτε έχω όρεξη να ποστάρω δουλειά που έπρεπε να κάνεις εσύ.<br>Το θέμα είναι όμως ότι και πριν υπήρχαν ατυχήματα από έλλειψη συντήρησης ή κατάργηση κάποιων μέτρων ασφάλειας.<br>Επίσης στην περίπτωση με το Rolling Contact Fatigue που πόσταρες, το ατύχημα θίγει το θέμα της "μικρής τεχνογνωσίας και εμπειρίας των υπαλλήλων" λέγοντας πως "τους προσλαμβάνουν χωρίς να χουν τα απαραίτητα προσόντα ή να πληρούν τις προυποθέσεις".<br>Θέλεις μήπως να ποστάρω ατυχήματα που έγιναν από ελλιπή γνώση ανθρώπων ή θέματα που χαν προκύψει με την υγεία (ψυχολογικά και λοιπά) και όμως συνέχιζαν να δουλεύουν την περίοδο 1974-1994;<br><br><br>Σου πα να δώσεις στατιστικά στοιχεία ---> Δεν το κανες.<br>Συνέχισες να μιλάς για τα 4 ίδια ατυχήματα.<br>Σου απέδειξα ότι παρόμοια ατυχήματα είχαν γίνει και πριν την ιδιωτικοποίηση και ίσως σε μεγαλύτερο ποσοστό. <br>Περιμένω να βγάλεις ποσοστά. Αλλιώς δεν σε παίρνει το θέμα.<br>
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